so significant considering the 95% confidence
limit, but devices for demining must avoid the
POD reduction as much as possible. The results suggest that the Gryphon can reduce FAR
more than the ALIS can. However, the absolute level of FARs is almost the same as shown
in Figure 2 (see page 68) and the larger FAR reduction is due to a larger number of false alarms
given by the metal detector implemented in the
Gryphon. Therefore, performances of the whole
system as dual sensor in terms of FAR can be
characterized as almost the same.
Figure 4 (see page 69) shows probability of
detections given by the metal detector and by
both sensors, along with the discrimination
ratio with respect to depth for each device.
As the theory in the Das and McFee article12
states and former trials verified, the PODs given by the metal detectors are decreasing with
depth. Since the GPRs are always used after
the metal detectors, the PODs used by the
dual sensors cannot exceed those by the metal detectors. It can be observed that the PODs
by both sensors positively correlate with the
PODs by the metal detectors.
Furthermore, discrimination ratios tend
to increase with depth in these results. This
fact cannot be determined conclusively because the number of mines belonging to each
depth class is small and the estimation would
not be sufficiently accurate. This tendency supports a common theory that GPR has difficulties in detecting shallowly buried targets since
reflections from the ground surface mask
those from targets.13 However, this observed
tendency is not as strong as expected; both
systems achieved about 0.7 of the discrimination ratio at the depth range from 0–3cm, so
the theory cannot clearly be confirmed. This
may be because both sensors measured data
of GPR as images in terms of horizontal slice
and this type of representation may be good at
depicting small changes close to the surface,
unlike only one-time signals or a vertical slice.
Conclusions and Discussion
The results of the test campaign for the
dual-sensor systems tell us that those systems reduced false-alarm rates significantly by
more than one-half. However, the systems also
reduced probability of detections, which must
be avoided in real clearance operations. Usefulness of the dual sensors may strongly depend
on improvements with POD.
The full report4 stated that the three deminers who worked on the ALIS achieved
different results in terms of POD, FAR and
working hours. The variation may be caused
by the way the deminers interpret the output
of the sensor and make decisions when operating the ALIS. The visual interpretation of
images and decision-making process are en-
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Blast Testing of Visors Used for
Humanitarian Demining
This article discusses experimental results from blast testing of Security Devices Ltd. polycarbonate visors used
by humanitarian deminers. Visors used in the blast testing fell into one of three categories: new visors, manually
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tirely subject to the operators themselves. In
order to avoid unstable and/or unexpected results, further developments/improvements,
such as an automatic-recognition algorithm,
are recommended.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to use
stand-alone metal detectors at the same time
as a benchmark, making a direct comparison
of dual sensors to stand-alone metal detectors
unavailable. However, one can roughly compare the detectors to those from the STEMD
trial, 5 taking into account additional metals.
The ALIS and the Gryphon needed approximately five and nine minutes, respectively, to
survey an average of one square meter. It can
be roughly estimated that the ALIS may be two
to three times slower and the Gryphon may
be four to five times slower than stand-alone
metal detectors.14 Even if the search speed in
this test is slower than for a stand-alone metal detector, it is possible that these dual sensors would accelerate the clearance operation
in total, because rejected alarms from metals
would reduce the need for excavation or could
be rapidly excavated. Increased search speed
would also multiply these benefits.
Another dual-sensor trial in Germany was
carried out in September 2009 by the International Test and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Demining and led by the German
Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement.15 The results are being analyzed and
we hope that a more detailed evaluation of dualsensor performance will be available soon.
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scratched visors, and scratched and heat-gun-repaired visors. Results show that the visors in all three categories
failed to meet the draft international standard for blast testing1 relevant at the time, that further research is
required to establish pressure profiles for the standard charge size being tested, and that the proposed heattreatment method does appear to degrade the blast resistance of the visor used in the test.2
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Figure 1: Testing platform and positioning rig.
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n 2007, the Director of the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies received a request to investigate a potentially promising
heat-treatment process to extend the operational life of humanitariandeminer visors through removal of scratches from the field of view. The
heat-treatment procedure was developed by undergraduate students
as part of a product-design course and was published in The Journal
of Mine Action.3 The authors of that article noted that further testing
would be required to determine whether the visor properties were adversely affected by the scratch-repair procedure. In order to allow for

an independent assessment of the technique, the authors provided a
detailed outline of the procedure in the article that readers could follow independently.
Trial Objectives and Methodology
The objective of this research was to assess the blast and ballistic performance of deminer visors before and after heat treatment. To ensure
compatibility with the original student project, the same type of visors
were obtained from Security Devices Ltd.
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Visor Description

Charge Size

Reference Pressure (psi)

Visor Outcome

New 1
New 2
New 3 + apron
New 4 + apron
New 5 + apron
Baseline established

200g
100g
100g
150g
100g
at 75g

59.2
32.2
35.3
42.1
36.1
No apron

Broke
Broke
Did not break
Broke
Broke

New 6
New 7
New 8
New 9

75g
75g
75g
75g

34.6
12.9
27.2
30.2

Did not break
Did not break – misfire
Did not break
Did not break

1B scratched
2B scratched
3B scratched
4B scratched

75g
75g
75g
75g

34.9
32.1
28.1
32.7

Broke
Did not break
Did not break
Did not break

1A scratched, heat treated
2A scratched, heat treated
3A scratched, heat treated
4A scratched, heat treated

75g
75g
75g
75g

28.0
26.3
35.6
31.6

Broke
Broke
Broke
Broke

Table 1: Visor blast test results.

Figure 2: Trial test site—heated inflatable tent.

The visors were placed in three categories for blast and ballistic assessment: new,
scratched, and scratched and heat-repaired.
Following the procedures in the original
project as closely as possible, a new visor was
scratched by rubbing sand on the outer surface
until the visor was opaque, which provided the
“scratched” condition. To get the “scratched
and heat-repaired” condition, a new visor was
scratched as described and then washed and
dried in an oven. After cooling, it was treated
using a heat gun in the manner described in
the students’ original project.3
The following documents were used as
guidance to develop the test methodologies
for blast and ballistic assessment:
•
“Test Methodologies for Personal
Protective Equipment Against AntiPersonnel Mine Blast”4
•
European Centre for StandardizationWorkshop Agreement 15756: “Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) – Personal
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•
•
•

Protective Equipment (PPE) – Test and
Evaluation”2
“Ballistic Test Method for Personal Armour Materials and Combat Clothing”5
“Protocols to Test Upper Body PPE
Against AP Blast Mines”6
“A Methodology for Evaluating Demining Personal Protective Equipment
for Antipersonnel Landmines” 7

Blast Assessment
Extensive research was conducted at
DRDC Suffield by Ceh, et al., between March
1999 and November 2000 (published in 20056)
to develop a protocol for testing and evaluation of upper-body AP blast mine personal
protective equipment. The detailed scientific and technical review resulted in a comprehensive understanding of the physics of a
mine blast, factors affecting the performance
of PPE, and the nature and severity of injuries depending on the deminer’s position at
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the time of the blast. From those findings a
protocol was developed to ensure the repetition of data, good replication of humanbody positioning and motion, representative
soil characteristics, standardized explosive
charges and containers, reference pressure
measurement, and relevant data acquisition
and processing.
With regard to the physics of an AP mine
blast, factors that needed to be controlled included the type of explosive used, the charge
container, depth of charge burial, type of soil,
distribution of larger soil particles, compaction and moisture content. These parameters
contributed to the strength and distribution of
the energy of the blast through the soil matrix
and expansion of detonation products and soil
ejecta 8 away from the center of the explosion.6
With regard to the performance of the
PPE, it was determined that the shape and
surface area of the PPE affected how the blast
wave and detonation products propagated

around it, thereby affecting how the force was
transmitted to the person wearing the PPE.
Brittle materials were found to break into
fragments that could be propelled at high velocity and cause injury to the person.6
Since the mid-1990s, anthropomorphic
mannequins have been used at DRDC Suffield for testing of PPE survivability against
AP mines. The mannequins are chosen to
match the body size and weight of human
PPE wearers and allow for instrumented
gauges to be placed inside for measurement
of body motion.
In the 2005 Ceh study,6 the position of the
deminer in relation to the blast was found to
greatly influence injury outcome. Humanitarian deminers often preferred a crouched or
kneeling position to a prone position because
it improved the field of view, made prodding
easier and was less fatiguing. However, from
an injury perspective, deminers in a kneeling position experienced more severe injuries
from blasts compared to those injured while
working in a prone position.
The desire to better control positioning of
the mannequin during trials led DRDC Suffield
to develop a testing platform and positioning rig. The platform allowed for exact placement of the mannequin a specific distance
away from the charge, which was buried to a
measured depth in a known quantity of standardized soil. Figure 1 on page 71 shows the
platform and rig placement. The measurement
fixture and reference pressure transducer can
be seen to the right of the mannequin.
The Hybrid III anthropomorphic mannequin, 5th-percentile female model was used
for all of the testing as it approximates the size
of typical Asian deminers more closely than
the other Hybrid III mannequins at DRDC
Suffield. The posture chosen for these tests

New Visors

Scratched Visors

Scratched and
Heat-treated Visors

New 6

1B Scratched

1A Scratched, Heat Treated

New 7

2B Scratched

2A Scratched, Heat Treated

New 8

3B Scratched

3A Scratched, Heat Treated

New 9

4B Scratched

4A Scratched, Heat Treated

Table 2: Visor blast testing post-trial photographs.
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Description

10N-NEW

V50

234m/s

Visor Condition

V50 (m/s)

Std Dev (m/s)

Bullet

FSP- 17

Vel. Spread

68m/s

New

234

29

Std Dev

29m/s

Scratched

226

40

Penetration (Y/N)

Used in V50 (Y/N)

Scratched & Heat Treated

247

18

Shot

Velocity Strike (m/s)

Velocity Residual (m/s)

1

485

Y

2

437

Y

Table 4: V50 test results summary.

3

255

Y

4

261

Y

5

151

0

N

Y

6

232

0

N

Y

7

262

Y

Y

8

206

0

N

9

323

216

Y

10

302

187

Y

11

254

12

194

13

367

14

301

Y
0

Y

300
Y

N

15

447
249

71

Y

17

360

264

Y

18

338

233

Y

NEW
REPAIRED

250
Vr(m/s)

200

Y

16

350

SCRATCHED

Y
171

400

Y
Y

150
100

Table 3: V50 test results example.

was a kneeling position, with both knees on
the ground. A wooden rig was used to position the hips and knees into the kneeling position, and the positioning rig was then used
to adjust the upper body of the mannequin.
The joints and neck were adjusted to give a
set stiffness, and were then readjusted between shots.
The positioning rig supports the mannequin in the desired position before the blast.
As soon as the blast pushes the mannequin
backward, the chains go slack and the round
crossbars fall from their supports, allowing
free movement of the mannequin during the
blast event. The measurement fixture is used to
ensure repeatable placement of various parts
of the mannequin body at specific X, Y and
Z distances from ground zero. A reference
pressure gauge was placed at 90 degrees to
the charge at the same height and radial distance from the blast as the mannequin’s visor
(60 cm).
The soil type used for testing is mediumgrain building sand, dried to less than 1%
moisture, packed loosely in the testing platform, and held in a container within the platform that is large enough to prevent reflected
shock wave interference from the walls of the
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container, yet small enough in volume to be
easily removed and replaced between trials
(60cm x 60cm x 60cm).
The charge containers that were used for this
study were developed at DRDC Suffield in the
late 1990s. They are AP mine surrogate containers made of Dupont Adiprene packed with C4
plastic explosive, boosted with datasheet and
center of axis initiated with an RP87 electric
detonator. The charge size for the blast testing of
visors in this trial was initially set at 200g C4 to
match the European Centre for Standardization
Workshop Agreement requirement of “an explosive equivalent to (240 ± 1)g cast tri-nitro
toluene,” 2 representing the charge size of the
PMN mine, which is one of the most frequently encountered AP blast mines. Initial testing
demonstrated that the new visors broke at the
200g charge size. This result necessitated scaling
back the charge size to 150g then 100g, before a
threshold of 75g for visor breakage was found.
In order to provide a suitable location for
blast testing in temperatures that reach -40 C
on the Suffield testing site in January, an inflatable tent was erected as shown in Figure 2 on
page 72. A portable heating unit was used to
provide a constant temperature of 15 C for testing the visors.
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The external temperatures in January in
Suffield, Alberta, Canada, average between -31
and -10 C and snowfall averages 22cm. In order
to minimize temperature effects on the polycarbonate visors, they were stored in a heated
building with the temperature maintained between 15 and 20 C. The visors were then transported in an insulated container to the heated
tent and placed on the Hybrid III mannequin.
The surface temperature was measured using
an infrared digital temperature-measurement
device and the trial commenced once the surface temperature reached 15 C.
Ballistic Assessment
The ballistic assessment was performed
by an external laboratory, in accordance
with Standard Agreement 29209 and International Mine Action Standard 10.30.10 The
objective of the V50 ballistic testing was to determine the fragment protection capability of
the PPE, with V50 representing the velocity at
which half of the projectiles perforate the target material. It is noted in IMAS 10.30 that
the STANAG 2920 test for ballistic protection may not provide a realistic assessment of
the fragment threats from mine blasts, but it
will continue to be used to estimate fragmen-

50

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

Vs(m/s)
Figure 3: Strike velocity (Vs) versus residual velocity (Vr).

tation protection until another international standard is developed. At
the time these tests were being prepared, the CEN Workshop Agreement
was only in a draft form and a formalized version was not available.
Hence, the V50 testing used the defined 17-grain cold-rolled, annealedsteel fragment-simulating projectile as a threat (type-1) test for each
visor tested. As with the blast tests, the ballistic tests were performed
on the original (new) visors, the scratched visors, and the scratched and
heat-treated visors.
The V50 testing was conducted using a V50 headform with the visor
headband aligned along the part line of the headform. A veil witness paper
was taped to the face of the headform and the fixture was aligned such
that the FSP struck with zero degrees of strike obliquity to the visor, as
determined with laser alignment through the bore of the rifle. A laboratorygrade .22 caliber long-rifle barrel firearm was used to fire the FSP. The
range for the testing was set at 5.0m and the distance from the exit of the
rifle muzzle to the strike face was 5.0m. A penetration was positive if it
resulted in a hole in either the visor or the witness paper.

Blast Test Results
The visor blast testing took place at DRDC Suffield from 15–22 January
2008. In total, 18 visors were subjected to blast testing in the enclosed, inflatable tent facility illustrated in Figure 2 on page 72. External daytime temperatures ranged from a high of -5 C to a low of -23 C, and wind speed ranged
from 11 to 65 km/h. Despite these extreme weather conditions, the temperature inside the tent was maintained at approximately 15 C with the assistance of two portable, diesel generators, and wind effects were negligible.
Testing began at the CEN Workshop Agreement’s recommended
charge size of 200g C4 (240g TNT equivalent). After failure of the visor
at 200g, the charge size was decreased to 100g. In an attempt to achieve
visor survival at charge sizes closer to the recommended standard, a deminer apron was added to the mannequin. However, with breakage of
the visor at 100g even with the apron, it was decided to proceed without
an apron and to reduce the charge size to 75g.
Table 1 on page 73 summarizes the results of the visor blast trials.
Note that visors “New 1” through “New 5” were consumed in attempts to
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get a charge size at which the new visors would
survive. The test data in which the three categories of visor can be compared starts with visor “New 6.”
Photographs and high-speed video were
taken of the visor blast trials. The photographs
in Table 2 (see page 73) show the extent of
damage to the visors that were broken in the
trial, as well as the post-blast photos of the visors that did not break. During the trials, the
pieces of broken visor were found dispersed
throughout the tent area and the pieces were
photographed where they landed. All visor
pieces were then collected and reconstructed
for the photographs as illustrated in Table 2
(see page 73).
Ballistic Test Results
The results of the ballistic tests were much
more difficult to interpret. IMAS 10.30 states
in paragraph 4.3: “PPE provided to reduce
the risk from such a hazard should include,
as a minimum … ballistic body armour with
a STANAG 2920 V50 rating (dry) of 450m/s.”
It continues, “Eye protection should be no
less than that offered by 5mm of untreated
polycarbonate.”10 It does not explicitly state
that the visor should provide a V50 rating of
450m/s, nor does it explicitly define what V50
rating provides an acceptable level of protection. Indeed, it is possible to use the note
about 5mm polycarbonate to allow any V50
rating to be acceptable as long as the visor
is made of polycarbonate 5mm or thicker.
This ambiguity makes evaluation of the results somewhat problematic.
Table 3 (see page 74) shows the V50 test data
for the new visor. The strike velocity is the velocity at which the projectile struck the face of
the visor. If the projectile traveled through the
visor and kept moving, its exit velocity was
shown as residual velocity. Residual velocity
was not captured in all cases. To calculate V50 ,
three shots that did not penetrate and three
shots that did penetrate were selected, while
attempting to keep the strike velocities reasonably similar (the target was within 60m/s).
This method prevents the far outlying data
such as shot 1 from influencing the V50 value.
The V50 ballistic tests are summarized in
Table 4 (see previous page). They show that
within the error of one standard deviation, all
three conditions of the visors have effectively the same V50 rating. If anything, the heat
treatment may have improved the V50 performance slightly.
Figure 3 (see previous page) presents the
results of the ballistic testing in a way that allows comparison of the three conditions. The
data points along the horizontal axis show the
shots in which complete penetration did not
occur (residual velocity is zero), while those
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above the horizontal axis show those that did
penetrate completely.
A variety of trend lines can be drawn
through the three data sets, but they are very
close to overlapping. With the wide spread
of velocities and relatively few data points,
there is really little or no significant difference among the three curves. In other words,
these tests suggest that neither the scratching
nor the heat treatment of the visors degraded
the new visors from a V50 ballistics standpoint.
Discussion
The results of the blast testing illustrate
that the threshold for visor breakage for
scratched, heat-repaired, and even new visors was far below the recommended charge
size, when 200g C4 was used. Comparison of
the results of the blast testing of the scratched
visors with the scratched and heat-treated visors, as noted in Table 2 (see page 73), reflects
more extensive shattering of the heat-treated visors. The significance of this difference
would require further testing, especially since
all three groups of visors were found to break
at less than half of the specified CEN Workshop Agreement charge size.
Observations from field experience suggest that visors subjected to detonations of up
to 240g TNT do not tend to shatter as they did
in these tests. Assuming these observations to
be accurate, it could indicate that there was a
flaw in the experiment or that the CWA option to use a substitute for TNT needs to be reviewed; either the equivalency criteria need to
be changed, or perhaps no substitute for TNT
should be allowed. More experimentation will
be needed to answer this question.
With regard to the V50 ballistic testing of
the visors, it was seen that all three groups
performed comparably. The estimated V50 falls
between 225 and 250 m/s for all three groups,
with no statistically significant difference
among the new visors, scratched visors and
heat-treated visors. STANAG 2920 is not clear
with respect to what V50 rating is required for
visors; it may be 450 m/s or it may simply be
a 5-mm-thick, untreated polycarbonate visor
with no requirement for a specific V50 rating.
Further, if the CEN Workshop Agreement
(CWA 15756) is taken as “an accepted alternative ... developed as an international standard”
(IMAS 10.30, para 4.3.a10), then a less damaging fragment may now be more appropriate for
future tests of this type.
Conclusions
Following the blast and ballistic testing of
the visors, it was determined that:
•
Scratching the visors did not appear to
have any detrimental effects on the blast
resistance of the visors.
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•

•

•

•

•

The proposed heat treatment of the
scratched visors appears to degrade the
blast resistance of the visors.
All of the visors, including new ones,
were broken during blast tests using
charge sizes half the size recommended
by the relevant standards.
Neither the scratching nor the heattreating process appears to have any detrimental effects on the V50 performance
of the visors under test. The V50 ratings
for new, scratched and heat-treated visors fall within the 225–250m/s range.
Contrary to popular opinion, there is
actually no requirement to have visors
achieve a V50 rating of 450m/s.
There is a need to investigate whether
the revised CWA should allow substitutions for TNT, and if so, what equivalency criteria should be applied.
See Endnotes, Page 79
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